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The Principle of Realism in American and
Modern European Jurisprudence
Benvenuto Griziotti*
American law may be contrasted with European law in that
the former is the result of judgments by men appointed to the
bench from the ranks of practicing lawyers, who reflect the
common sense of justice. European law, on the other hand, is the
product of scholarly career judges, who are more likely to follow
the technical criteria of positive law, even if they are led to an
interpretation that does not coincide with what is felt to be just
and equitable. But in recent times, even European jurisprudence
has shown a growing tendency to take into account the realities
of the situation and the aims of the law in question, so that the
letter of the law does not prevent a decision based on the equities
of the case, within the framework of the law's aims. This is a
survey of the influence of economic reality on American and
modern European fiscal law, together with an evaluation of the
merits of the European as well as the American approach to this
problem.
In the United States, juridical tradition prevails over positive
law in reaching decisions. The school of legal thought represented by Roscoe Pound seeks to illuminate the economic, social,
and philosophical content of the law. An American judge, it is
said, looks for a result which does substantial justice and best
corresponds with the aims of the particular law, and then writes
an opinion to give his decision the proper legal form. In the field
of tax law, this tendency is illustrated by a host of decisions
*The author, formerly Professor of the Science of Finance and of Financial
Law at the University of Pavia, Italy, died on November 2, 1956. The teacher of
many illustrious students, among them the deceased Minister of the Budget of
the Republic of Italy, Senator Ezio Vanoni, he wrote extensively on problems of
financial, economic, monetary and credit policy; his attention was also drawn to
problems of international finance, economics and politics. The major part of his
essays was republished in the volumes: "Essays on The Revival of the Science
of Finance and of Financial Law" and "Studies in the Science of Finance and
Financial Law." Among his text books, particularly noteworthy is his "First
Elements of the Science of Finance."
The article published here was translated from the Italian by Guido Calabresi,
third year student at the Yale Law School, and was somewhat revised for publication here by Boris I. Bittker, professor of law, Yale Law School, who lectured
at the University of Pavia, on a Fulbright grant, at the inVitation of Professor
Griziotti in 1955.
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which stress the economic reality of the transaction before the
court rather than the technical language of the statute. Emphasis on economic reality may be seen in such a case as Helvering v. Clifford,' taxing the grantor of a short-term trust on
its income although he had irrevocably surrendered control of
the income for the period of the trust. The same refusal to
permit title or other technicalities to override the dictates of
equity may be seen in the "family partnership" cases, holding
that partnership income is taxable to the person whose personal
efforts produced it, rather than to the person entitled to receive
it under the partnership agreement, unless the partnership exists
in substance as well as in form- unless "the parties in good
faith and acting with a business purpose intended to join together in the present conduct of the enterprise."12 Another example is the "business purpose" rule of the Gregory case,8 holding that a series of transactions that constituted a "corporate
reorganization" so far as the mere letter of the law was concerned could not be treated as such for want of economic reality;
the Supreme Court refused to confer the status of a true corporate reorganization on what was "simply an operation having no
business or corporate purpose - a mere device which put on
the form of a corporate reorganization as a disguise for concealing its real character and the sole object and accomplishment of
which was the consummation of a preconceived plan, not to reorganize a business or any part of a business, but to transfer a
parcel of corporate shares to the petitioner."' 4 Still another example is Higgins v. Smith, 5 refusing to allow the sole shareholder
of a corporation to deduct a loss suffered on a sale of property to
his own corporation. Many other examples could be adduced. 6
In Switzerland the method of interpretation according to
economic reality is considered by Blumenstein 7 and in the reports
1. 309 U.S. 331 (1940).
2. Commissioner v. Culbertson, 337 U.S. 733 (1949). See also Commissioner
v. Tower, 327 U.S. 280 (1946), and Lusthaus v. Commissioner, 327 U.S. 293
(1946).
3. Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465 (1935).
4. Id. at 469.
5. Higgins v. Smith, 308 U.S. 473 (1940).
6. E.g., McWilliams v. Commissioner, 331 U.S. 694 (1947) ; Commissioner v.
Laughton, 113 F.2d 103 (9th Cir. 1940). There are, of course, also cases where
the argument of form versus substance has not prevailed: e.g., Chamberlin v.
Commissioner, 207 F.2d 462 (6th Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 918 (1954);
Alprosa Watch Corp. v. Commissioner, 11 T.C. 240 (1948).
7. BLUMENSTEIN, SYSTEM DES STERERRECHTS (Germany 1951), translated into
Italian by FoRTE, SISTEMA DI DIRITTO DELLE IMPOSTE (Italy 1954).
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of the Federal Tribunal 8 as a criterion to be adopted to ascertain
the economic significance of the phenomenon, when this is required by the law. This criterion comes into play particularly in
income tax cases, since the concept of income assumed by the
legislator is an economic concept. In particular, unlawful profits
are taxable and unlawful expenses are deductible. Furthermore,
it finds vast application in decisions on tax evasion. In fact, in
the Helvetian Commonwealth tax evasion is attacked directly
with special rules holding that legal maneuvers made with the
aim of avoiding the tax, in a particular case, shall have no such
effect.9 Furthermore, theory and practice are in accord in not
recognizing the effects of tax evasion in the particular case,
that is, in considering the case as if true evasion had not occurred. According to Blumenstein (who accepts a more restricted
concept than others), three things are necessary to evasion:
subjectively, an intent to avoid or lessen taxes; objectively, an
abnormality of the transaction or of its form; and, retrospectively, an actual tax saving. 10 Blumenstein recognizes that
greater weight is given to economic reality as a general principle
in German legislation than in Swiss. In the latter, for example,
according to Blumenstein, emphasis upon general categories of
economic concepts is limited by the Swiss constitutional principle
of equality of law, which requires a consideration of the special
circumstances of each individual case.
In France the criterion of holding strictly to the literal and
technical interpretation of the law prevails." On the other hand,
however, there is often cited the formulation expressed in the
conclusions of the Government Commissioner, Corneille, before
the Conseil d'Ptat: "Tax law is concerned with questions of fact
and not of legal theory."' 12 This formulation is certainly significant in its adherence to the principle of economic reality,
and was followed in other cases, such as a 1935 judgment of the
8. T.F., 45, I, p. 26; 46, I,p. 184.
9. Tax on Exchanges, arts. 8, 40; Federal Luxury Tax, arts. 9, 20; Executive
Ordinance on the Stamp Law, art. 5; Law of San Gallo on Cantonal and City
Taxes, art. 2; Protective Tax, arts. 7, 20; Law on Custom Duty, art. 8, with
ordinance on the tare.
10. See note 7 supra.
11. T.F. 59, I, 284; 64, I, p. 402, 71, I, p. 392; 75, I, p. 60.
12. Judgment of January 21, 1921, D. 1922, 3, 36. Corneille adds: "It saisit la
matidre imposable, Id6n elie s'y trouve, sans se prdoccuper de savoir ce qu'elle
vant en droit." Of. H4Brand, L'Autonomie de droit fiscal serait-elle un moyen de

favoriser lea accords internationaux,in

CAHIER DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL

(I.F.A.) ;

BASEL, VERLAG FUR RECHT UND GESELLSCHAFT 49 (1939) ; JEZE, COURS DE FNANCLS PUnJxJQUES 207 (France 1933)
GAZETTz losAs
458 (France 1952).

; Dufour, de I'autonomie du droit fiscal, in
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Conseil d'Atat which established that "the fiscal authority is
sovereign in all that concerns evaluations of fact, being not at all
tied down to the formal rights of commercial law.""8
In England the doctrine, that in interpreting tax laws the
substance of the transaction rather than its legal form must be
looked at, was at one time established. But the case of Duke of
Westminster v. Commissioners of Inland Revenue resulted in a
decision opposed to such a doctrine - that is that "one must
recognize the real legal effect of the transaction."'1

4

The facts

were the following: the Duke, in order to pay a smaller surtax,
agreed with several of his employees that he would halve their
salaries and make up the difference by guaranteeing payment of
an annuity. He did this in order to deduct the value of these
annuities from his income subject to surtax. Although sustained
in this case, this device was outlawed by the Finance Act of
1946.15
In Belgium, both in theory and in case law, it has been recognized that tax liability is based on economic reality rather than
on legal abstractions.
Income taxes cannot be based either on possibilities or on
false appearances, since they cannot be collected except from
real income actually realized; and from the moment this fact
exists, the State ought not to look to see if the income is legal
or not: the tax strikes earnings from gambling or wages, even if
they are forbidden by the criminal law. 16 Even with the stamp
tax, in which the object of tax is a juristic act, the legislator intends to tax the economic realities which follow from the act and
not the legal abstraction involved.
But above all it was in Germany, at the end of 1918-19 when
Dr. Enzo Becker had to plan the great reform of the German tax
system, that the need of fighting fiscal fraud worked through
the "appearances" of civil law was seen. Becker found that the
major difference between a legal fiction and an actual concealment lay in the economic background. He, therefote, held it
13. Judgment of January 23, 1935, Sirey, 1936, 3, 33. A note by M. L. on this
decision in the same journal states the principles that "to say that tax law, by
its very nature, strikes questions of pure fact signifies that in public finance facts
prevail over legal theory."
14. Duke of Westminster v. Commissioner of Inland Revenue, 19 T.C. 490
(1935)..
15. McBAIN, PRACTICAL NOTES ON THE LAW OF INCOME TAX 07-98 (England

1950).
16. App. Bruxelles, 1-11-1930, Pas(icrisie), 1930, II, 91.
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necessary to have a rule relative to tax evasion stating that
"the duty to pay taxes may not be evaded or lessened by abuse of
forms or adaptions of the civil code." '17 It would still be necessary
to define closely what would be deemed "abuse." On the other
hand it is extraordinarily difficult from the point of view of
legislative techniques to reduce the types of situations where a
tax is meant to apply into a brief formulation that can be employed in determining tax liability. One is thrown back, therefore, on the concepts generally used in civil law. But here the
danger arises that these concepts (so old and so well known, in
contrast to the new concepts of fiscal law) might be considered to
be valid and decisive even in tax law.
To prevent this serious peril, Dr. Enzo Becker added as
Article 4 a rule of interpretation, that, "in interpreting tax laws,
one must consider their purpose, their economic significance, and
the origin of all the circumstances."' 8
To this end, Becker put his hopes on the Reichsfinanzhof.
These hopes were not disappointed. The injunction to consider
their purpose and their economic significance in interpreting
fiscal laws, vague as it of course was in itself, brought forth rich
fruit in the handling of concepts taken from civil law in the tax
field, and in the forming of economic concepts in fiscal law. 19
Thus was assured the development of fiscal law into an autonomous field of law. The sense of realism which pervades all of
fiscal law has found here its decisive expression. Becker asserted that he who applies tax laws must take his lead not from
formal concepts but from things, from the facts themselves in
20
their true significance.
From the teachings of Becker and from his work as "divisional president" of the Reichsfinanzhof originated a rich and
learned German literature which developed the principle of economic reality, and which was not without influence on Italian
doctrine, especially through the work of Ezio Vanoni in his
17. Becker, Accertamento e 8viluppo del diritto tributario tedesco, in 1 Riv.
DIR. FIN. E Sc. F. 155-65 (1937). See also Becker, Applicazione dell' impoata
aecondo criteri economici obiettivi nella giurisprudenza delta Corte Finanziariadel
Reich, 2 Riv. DIm. FIN. E. Sc. F. 220 et seq. (Italy 1937).
18. See note 17 supra.
19. See note 17 supra. Becker discusses the judgment of the Reichsfinanzhof,
5 May 1937, VI A 22937, which determined that transactions and reorganizations
have to be handled, fori tax purposes, in a way which corresponds to objective
economic criteria.
20: See note 17 supra.
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Natura e interpretazione delle leggi tributarie (Nature and Interpretation of Fiscal Law). 21 Vanoni sets down, as a canon of
interpretation of tax laws, the principle that in order to comply
with the purpose of the statute, it is necessary to evaluate accurately the economic function of the facts to which the tax law
refers. Becker's position was similarly cited and followed in
22
Dino Jarach's important work on the stamp tax.
In Italy consideration of the economic facts is fundamental
in the study of fiscal law because taxation necessarily is concerned with facts that are obviously economic in nature (income,
capital, the transfer of wealth) rather than legal abstractions
Even before its establishment in other countries, this principle established itself in Italy, where it sank broad and deep
roots, giving rise to the principle of economic reality, which influenced both the Italian case law and the theory of law.
The "science of finance and of fiscal law," as taught in Italian
universities is, in fact, a reflection of the economo-legal philosophy of Gian Domenico Romagnosi. 23 This philosophy, which
bridges the eighteenth and the nineteenth centuries and was reaffirmed by his notable pupils, stands for the position that the
study of fiscal law cannot end with juristic formulations because
it must consider the political and economic factors which give
substance to the financial phenomena involved.
After this survey, a few general observations may be made.
It is clear that American law is inspired by criteria of optimism, dynamism, and faith that common opinion reflects the
equitable and general interest, and that this is true both in the
area where case law and precedent are controlling and, as in the
tax field, where written law controls and where precedents indicate the interpretations previously adopted. Classic European
law, on the other hand, is pessimistic as regards the interpreters
of the law and is in a certain sense authoritarian, because a literal application of the written law serves to chain the thought
of the judiciary and of the administrator to the opinions prevalent at the time the legislation was adopted, even if the dynamics
of the situation would call for an adjustment of the law to a new
21. Vanoni, at 183, 231 et seq. (Italy 1932).
22. JARACH, PRINCIPI PER L'APPLICAZIONE DELLE TASSE DI REGISTRO (Principles
for the application of the stamp duty) 41 et seq. (Italy 1937).
23. See "G. D. Romagnosi," 13 ENCY. Soc. Sc. 419.
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reality. Classic European law is not disturbed if the written
law as applied does not correspond with justice, so long as "the
law" is formally recognized and followed. In Europe, then,
juristic science requires that judicial techniques follow the formal requirements of positive law, rather than the substantial
recognition of justice.
These faults of classical European jurisprudence do not become apparent in the application of civil law, since it is an essentially static body of law and can assume without undue difficulty the schema of Roman Law. In the financial field, on the
other hand, these faults do manifest themselves, because this
field is always subject to dynamic forces which express themselves in a two-fold way, that is, through the continuous change
in political viewpoint of the public authorities and in the profound dynamism of economic forces. Because of these forces in
the field of public finance, there has been a rapprochement between the controlling criteria of American and European jurisprudence in recent decades in several European countries, in the
written law itself, in law as it has been applied, and in legal
theory. Nonetheless, it must be recognized that the rapprochement has barely begun in Europe, and that American jurisprudence still surpasses its European counterpart in its recognition
of the criteria of realism and of the importance of justice above
the mere formal observance of the law.
On the other hand, it is well to put into perspective the excellence of European thought in this field, in countries like Italy,
Germany, and to a certain extent Switzerland, in which lands
there has been a rebirth of fiscal jurisprudence as a reaction to
the technical formalism of classic law. In Italy the legal and
economic philosophy of Gian Domenico Romagnosi, even in the
first half of the last century, pointed out that law and economics
are interdependent. Law presumes a knowledge of the economy;
economics a knowledge of a legal framework within which the
economy operates. The Italian legislator, who in 1876 extended
to all Italian universities the teaching of public finance (first
begun in 1859 by Luigi Cossa in the University of Pavia), gave
the chair established in the Faculty of Law the name of "Science
of Finance and of Financial Law," so that the study of public
finance would broaden its scope and provide a scientific basis for
the law of finance. This meant that the scope of legal theory
in this area was to go beyond the formal task of describing what
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the law is, to the more substantial task of determining why the
law is as it is.
The studies which I began in 1914 and which were continued
by such notable Italian scholars as Vanoni, Pugliese, Jarach,
Maffezoni, Pomini, and Forte, led to a systematic study of the
function of the law of public finance, in order to apply the law
to concrete cases realistically and with a proper regard for the
language of the statute.
Similarly, the judicial revolution promoted in Germany in
1919, by Becker, which caused a new approach to be taken in
legislation, jurisdiction, case law, and in fiscal doctrine, as compared to the rigid German fiscal school of legal formalism and
positive law, had the result of bringing the case law closer to
the real and concrete needs of financial justice and of allowing
it to follow the political and economic dynamics of the country.
In Switzerland, Blumenstein, by always keeping in mind the
concrete object of the tax, was a teacher of the greatest importance in promoting the progress of fiscal doctrine and case law
in his country. But he did not reach the point of completely
freeing himself from the chains of legal technicalities and of the
traditions of Roman and civil law, and this prevented him from
grasping the natural and complete autonomy of fiscal law within
the corpus of legal theory.
At the same time one must recognize the great scientific
progress of American case law, to which one must attribute the
very great achievement of having defined more clearly and fundamentally the concept of taxable wealth and of identifying the
elements which must be subtracted in reaching the concept of
taxable income, always with full recognition of the concrete needs
of economic life. The result of this careful work of American
case law is reflected in legislation and in the science of public
finance, both of which have come to stand on a very high plane
in comparison with fiscal legislation and the science of public
finance in Europe. This has occurred, it is true, because of the
different circumstances of Europe and America as a result of
two world wars. America has risen to the heights of prosperity,
which has favored the development of centers of scientific study,
while Europe has fallen into a period of deep depression, during
which the progress of science has suffered. As a consequence of
the development of American case law, American legal theory
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has made great strides in the definition of taxable income. The
science of public finance has also been enriched in America by
technical studies in business economics.
But a bridge between financial theory and the law of finance
does not exist, with the result that the science of public finance
in the United States is concerned primarily with research in the
economics of finance, which has been an especially intriguing
field because of the extent of government intervention in the
economy since the 1929 depression. But the science of public
finance has not broadened itself to the point of deepening the
study of the scientific problems involved in the application of
fiscal law. Thus, American fiscal law and the science of public
finance, though having points of tangency, have followed divergent roads.
Perhaps it is appropriate to suggest that great progress
would result if the study of public finance in the United States
could be joined to the study of law, broadening the content of the
science of public finance and producing a more systematic examination of the case law.
In Europe, on the other hand, a broader and more rapid evolution of the classic, formal schema of positive law towards a
modern conception of legal science and jurisprudence is to be
desired, especially in the area of public finance, so that it may
take into account the political and economic dynamics of the
circumstances of the taxpayer.
Perhaps this brief study of American and European fiscal
law has indicated the usefulness, for both Europe and America,
of a better knowledge of each other's case law and legal theory
in the fiscal field, in order to deepen and perfect the study of the
resolution of disputes between taxpayers and the fiscal authorities.

